Naturalness and Historicity: Strauss and Klein on the  Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns by Manca, Danilo
 
Dipartimento di Civiltà e Forme del Sapere, Università di Pisa            Philosophical Readings IX.1 (2017), pp. 44-49. 
Pisa, Italia                      DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.826091 
e-mail: danilomanca30@gmail.com 
 
 
Naturalness and Historicity: Strauss and Klein on the  
Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns* 
 
Danilo Manca 
 
 
Abstract: In the current article I discuss the different 
ways in which Leo Strauss and Jacob Klein interpret the 
need of reopening the hoary quarrel between the ancients 
and the moderns. Their task is to response to the crisis of 
reason characterizing European thought and the style of 
life after the First World War. This provides me with the 
opportunity to address the issue of how philosophy should 
face the problem of its naturalness and historicity. I argue 
that Strauss’s position can be understood as the mirror-
image of that of Klein. Strauss thinks that the return to the 
ancients could overcome the historicist approach to 
fundamental issues characterizing modern philosophy, 
and consequently arise the problem of the nature of things 
over again. Klein thinks that the return to the ancients can 
lead modern man back to the hidden roots of its typical 
philosophical approach. The model for Strauss’s approach 
to philosophical eternal issues is the medieval commen-
tary. On the contrary, Klein holds that the philosopher 
should devote himself, or herself, to doing history of phi-
losophy, by reconstructing how philosophical paradigms 
changes over the centuries.  
 
Keywords: Leo Strauss, Jacob Klein, historicity, natural-
ness, the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The quarrel between the ancients and the moderns is 
not only a debate that heated up and shook the Académie 
française in the early 17th century. It can also be con-
sidered a strategy through which modern philosophy 
strove to circumscribe its epoch and to define its way of 
thinking. Thinkers such as Galileo, Descartes and Hobbes 
spent time and filled pages to mark the difference be-
tween their worldview and that of Aristotle and the Scho-
lastics. Thinkers such as Schiller and Hegel delve deeper 
into the difference between the ancients and the moderns 
in order to acquire awareness of its epoch and foster a 
revolution of it.    
 The quarrel was intentionally reopened in the 20th 
century by some Jewish native thinkers who studied with 
Husserl and Heidegger and appreciated Nietzsche. Such 
an operation constitutes their response to the crisis of rea-
son in their time. Leo Strauss and his lifelong friend Jacob 
Klein were two supporters of this operation1. In the fol-
lowing article, I will focus on the different ways in which 
Strauss and Klein interpret this quarrel, since this pro-
vides me with the opportunity to address the issue of how 
philosophy should face the problem of its naturalness and 
historicity.  
 
 
2. Historicity and Naivety in Modern Philosophy 
 
At the beginning of his article on Political Philosophy 
and History, Strauss claims that “political philosophy is 
not a historical discipline.” In his view, the philosophical 
questions concerning the nature of political things and the 
problem of the best political order are fundamentally dif-
ferent from historical questions, “which always concern 
individuals: individual groups, individual human beings, 
individual achievements, individual ‘civilizations’, the 
one individual ‘process’ of human civilization from its 
beginning to the present.”2  
 Strauss distinguishes the questions of political phi-
losophy from those of the history of political philosophy. 
Political philosophy seeks the essence of political things. 
On the contrary, the history of political philosophy fo-
cuses on “how this or that philosopher or all philosophers 
have approached, discussed or answered the philosophic 
question mentioned.”3 Yet, this does not mean that the 
political philosophy is absolutely independent of history.   
According to Strauss, the history of philosophy contri-
butes to the development of political philosophy in two 
ways. Firstly, it represents a preliminary activity without 
which political philosophy cannot comprehend its essen-
tial task: “Without the experience of the variety of politi-
cal institutions and convictions in different countries and 
at different times, the questions of the nature of political 
things and of the best […] political order could never 
been raised.”4 In other words, it is after having realized 
that political forms and political opinions are many, that 
we ask what is the best or the most worthwhile political 
order. Secondly, the history of philosophy is auxiliary to 
political philosophy: “Only historical knowledge can pre-
vent one from mistaking the specific features of the po-
litical life of one’s time and one’s country for the nature 
of political things.”5  
 Strauss stresses that the history of political philosophy 
“does not form an integral part” of political philosophy, 
since it is necessarily concerned with the contingent as-
pects of the philosophical questioning activity.  
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 At the beginning of his article, Strauss does not 
specify whether his position on the role that the history of 
philosophy plays in the philosophical activity is valid at 
any time. But, after a few pages, we understand that he 
was exclusively referring to the ancient state of affairs. 
Indeed, from his perspective, we routinely take for 
granted that “historical knowledge forms an integral part 
of the highest kind of learning.”6 However, if we look 
back to the past, we realize that “when Plato sketched in 
his Republic a plan of studies, he mentioned arithmetic, 
geometry, astronomy,” but “he did not allude to history.” 
And still, Aristotle, who “was responsible of the most 
outstanding historical research done in classical an-
tiquity,”7 saw poetry as more philosophical than history. 
In the ancient and medieval ages “history was left to anti-
quarians rather than to philosophers.”8 
 The situation changes in the 16th century when history 
becomes a specific field, “a world of its own fundamen-
tally different from, although of course related to, that 
other ‘field’, ‘Nature’.”9  
 When history became an object of knowledge, the 
dream of a “philosophy of history” arose. In other words, 
many thinkers entertain the idea that the historical becom-
ing follows an order which can be explored and reduced 
to some categories. Furthermore, although the universal 
issues of traditional philosophy were not abandoned, they 
were integrated with a concern for the influence that a 
historically determined culture within which a philoso-
pher was born has exercised on his thought and method. 
Hence, any attempt to address the universal issues of tra-
ditional philosophy must now be considered historically 
conditioned. Such a changement led to historicism: “‘His-
tory’ itself seems to have decided in favour of histori-
cism.”10  
 At the end of his article, Strauss proposes applying 
historicism to itself. Historicizing historicism means to 
acknowledge that the success of historicism depends on a 
peculiar character of modern philosophy, which Strauss 
outlines as follows:  
 
Modern political philosophy or science, as distinguished from 
pre-modern political philosophy or science, is in need of the his-
tory of political philosophy or science as an integral part of its 
own efforts. For historicism asserts that the fusion of philo-
sophic and historical marks in itself a progress beyond ‘naive’ 
non-historical philosophy, whereas we limit ourselves to assert-
ing that that fusion is, within the limits indicated, inevitable on 
the basis of modern philosophy, as distinguished from pre-
modern philosophy or ‘the philosophy of the future’.11 
 
By assuming to be the only acceptable approach to phi-
losophy, historicism overlooks its limits and misses an 
important point: once it claims that all answers to philo-
sophical questions are necessarily historically condi-
tioned, it has to accept that this claim, too, is subject to 
the context from which it comes about. In other words, 
the idea that philosophical questions are one with histori-
cal questions should be considered a historically condi-
tioned truth in turn. The philosopher who catches this 
point is already out of historicism. The philosopher who 
holds that the history of philosophy is an integral part of 
philosophical activity only in the modern age has already 
reopened the quarrel between the ancients and the mod-
erns. More specifically, this philosopher is spontaneously 
driven to bracket the idea according to which the modern 
fusion of philosophical and historical questions is in itself 
a progress. The general aim is to understand what kind of 
difference there is between “pre-modern non-historical 
philosophy” and the modern historical one12.  
 Strauss explains this difference by saying that pre-
modern philosophy is intrinsically “naïve,” whereas mod-
ern philosophy “consists to a considerable extent of inher-
ited knowledge.”13 These assertions are strictly connected 
with each other: inherited knowledge cannot be naïve; ra-
ther, it has to be taken as acquired knowledge. Strauss 
distinguishes inherited knowledge from independently 
acquired knowledge. By inherited knowledge, he means 
“the philosophic or scientific knowledge a man takes over 
from former generations, or, more generally expressed, 
from others”14; by independently acquired knowledge, he 
means “the philosophic or scientific knowledge a mature 
scholar acquires in his unbiased intercourse, as fully en-
lightened as possible as to its presuppositions, with his 
subject matter.”15  
 In Strauss’s view, modern political philosophy inevi-
tably keeps a specific form of dependence on classical 
philosophy. More specifically, it appears as a modifica-
tion of, and even in opposition to, an earlier political phi-
losophy. Hence, modern political philosophy has only two 
chances: it can remain an inherited knowledge, unaware 
of the tradition from which, and in opposition to which, it 
was acquired. Alternatively, it can be transformed into 
genuine knowledge “by re-vitalizing its original discov-
ery, and to discriminate between the genuine and the spu-
rious elements of what claims to be inherited knowledge.”  
 In light of this, my questions are now the following: 
by “genuine elements” does Strauss mean that part of 
classical thought which is kept sedimented in modern 
thought? If so, should we draw the conclusion that mod-
ern thought is not genuine in itself? Is it necessarily de-
rived? I am convinced that Strauss's conclusion is more 
articulated than that could seem to be reached here. First 
of all, he is inclined to think that is that modern political 
philosophy could be said to be genuine, but is in no way 
natural.  
 Strauss spells this out by quoting Hegel and by refer-
ring to Jacob Klein. In particular, he quotes the following 
passage taken from Hegel’s foreword in Phenomenology 
of Spirit:  
 
The manner of study in ancient times is distinct from that of 
modern times, in that the former consisted in the veritable train-
ing and perfecting of the natural consciousness. Trying its pow-
ers at each part of its life severally, and philosophizing about 
everything it came across, the natural consciousness transformed 
itself into a universality of abstract understanding which was 
active in every matter and in every respect. In modern times, 
however, the individual finds the abstract form ready made.16    
  
Strauss identifies “the natural consciousness” with the 
pre-philosophical one. From this perspective, the final re-
sults of the philosophic efforts of classical antiquity 
would represent the starting point of modern thought. 
Whether the results of antiquity were taken for granted or 
consciously modified, modern political philosophy cannot 
be described as simply emerging from the “natural con-
sciousness.” In fact, it does not arise from a direct refer-
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ence to political phenomena as they are accessible to a 
pre-philosophical thought in daily experience. But this 
does not imply that modern philosophy cannot be said to 
be genuine. It is genuine insofar as it recognizes the gap 
and the specific relation of “dependence” that it maintains 
with classical philosophy. Put differently, modern phi-
losophy can be genuine, but in no way natural. Its starting 
point is the result of a tradition, therefore it cannot in any 
way be naïve. And if a modern philosopher thinks himself 
naïve, then he is simply taking for granted the work of 
generations of pre-modern thinkers.  
 In a note to Hegel’s quote, Strauss invites us to con-
sider Jacob Klein’s Die griechische Logistik und die Ent-
stehung der modernen Algebra for a more precise analy-
sis, in particular he refers to page 122, which coincides 
with the first page of the introduction to the second part of 
the book. This paragraph is entitled “Über die Differenz 
antiker und moderner Begrifflichkeit.” Here Klein dis-
cusses the relationship between the ancient and the mod-
ern approach to scientific activity: “The ancient mode of 
thinking and conceiving is, after all, not totally ‘strange’ 
or closed to us.”17 The “new” modern science arises out of 
the bequest of the ancient science. Its starting point is a 
“science already in existence,” whereas the Greek science 
has a “natural’ basis.” In other words, Greek science 
comes up as a modification of, and stands in opposition 
to, a non- or pre-scientific attitude. By contrast, the new 
modern science is erected “in deliberate opposition to the 
concepts and methods”18 of Greek science. Up to now, 
Strauss’s account is very close to Klein’s.  
 However, Klein takes a position that, in my view, is 
not the same as Strauss’s. Klein attributes to modern phi-
losophy a form of naturalness as well. More specifically, 
he notices that the opposition of some founders of the 
new science, such as Galileo, Stevin, Kepler and Des-
cartes, to the ancient mode of thinking and conceiving is, 
rather, an opposition to a consolidated tradition: 
 
They are carried by an original impulse which is quite foreign to 
the learned science of the schools. The scientific interest of these 
men and their precursors is kindled mostly by problems of ap-
plied mechanics and applied optics, by problems of architecture, 
of machine construction, of painting, and of the newly discov-
ered instrumental optics.19 
 
This leads Klein to claim that “whereas the ‘naturalness’ 
of Greek science is determined precisely by the fact that it 
arises out of ‘natural’ foundation, […] the naturalness of 
modern science is an expression of its polemical attitude 
toward school science.”20 Put in Strauss’s words, whereas 
the naturalness of Greek philosophy lies on an attitude 
pointed toward the phenomena of the pre-scientific world, 
the naturalness of the moderns is rooted in their capacity 
to turn their attention from knowledge acquired by the 
school to knowledge genuinely graspable by experiment-
ing.  
In such a way, Klein does not deny that modern phi-
losophy could be naïve. He notices that modern science is 
characterized by a symbolic formalism and a calculational 
technique: “It determines its objects by reflecting on the 
way in which these objects become accessible through a 
general method.”21 Moreover, whereas ancient science 
illustrates its determinate object, modern science signifies 
its possible determinacy; whereas ancient concepts di-
rectly refer to the object, modern concepts refer only indi-
rectly to the object and directly to other concepts.22 How-
ever, by considering Klein’s position in relation with 
Strauss’s distinction between genuine and inherited 
knowledge, the naturalness of the moderns appears to be 
one with its genuine attitude.  
 For Strauss, knowledge could be described as genuine 
inasmuch as it is acquired by re-vitalizing the original ho-
rizon within which a discovery occurred. In other words, 
in order to be genuine, knowledge should be free of inher-
ited elements.  It is necessary that we assume no elements 
by tradition surreptitiously and unconsciously. This is 
possible only if we strive to re-activate the naivety char-
acterizing the natural attitude of the ancients. We have to 
reconstruct an attitude pointed toward the pre-scientific 
world which was natural for the ancients.  
 Klein shares with Strauss the idea that knowledge is 
genuine if not mediated by tradition. However, unlike 
Strauss, Klein thinks that modern philosophy is not made 
genuine by an act aimed at reproducing the natural con-
sciousness of the ancients, or by one striving to do it. Ra-
ther, founders of modern philosophy think in a genuine 
way once they begin by opposing the ancient mode of 
thinking, which works on them as inherited knowledge. 
Moreover, the naturalness of modern philosophy cannot 
coincide with the effort to act as if one were naïve. Obvi-
ously, the modern pre-scientific world is no longer the 
ancient one. New elements belong to the sphere of the 
modern everyday experience. The ancients had acquired 
these elements, which successively are natural for the 
moderns. This is the case, for instance, of the geometric 
structure of natural objects. In modern times, such struc-
ture becomes spontaneously graspable “by a naked eye.”  
 
 
3. On the Nature of Historical Activity 
 
Klein’s position undermines Strauss’s conviction that 
modern philosophy cannot establish a direct relation with 
the pre-scientifical horizon of daily experience. Klein re-
defines the role that the history of philosophy might play 
in the typical philosophical activity of questioning. Let 
me explain my idea in two steps: in the first, I will focus 
on the idea of naturalness; in the second, I will come back 
to the problem of the history of philosophy.  
One of the authors Strauss and Klein are thinking of 
when they speak of the naturalness of consciousness is 
Husserl. He was elected by Klein as his most relevant 
teacher, but also Strauss gave him some credit. In his arti-
cle on “The Living Issues of German Postwar Philoso-
phy,” Strauss says that Husserl’s phenomenology “sur-
passes in significance everything I know of, which was 
done in Germany in the last 50 years.”23 Furthermore, he 
adds that Husserl’s analysis of the transformation of the 
geometry underlying Galileo’s physics in Crisis is “the 
model for any analysis concerning the basic assumptions 
of modern science and philosophy.”24 
In Crisis § 9h Husserl describes Galileo at once as “a 
discovering and concealing genius” [entdeckender und 
verdeckender Genius]25. Indeed, while discovering the 
mathematical world as a horizon of limit-forms, Galileo 
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conceals the life-world, that is the natural pre-scientific 
horizon from which scientific inquiry comes up and in 
which it is necessarily grounded. However, this does not 
entail that modern thinkers have no life-world. We have 
to distinguish the form of the prescientific life-world from 
its contents. The form, Husserl argues, is the same at any 
time. The life-world is the horizon within which man 
lives straightforwardly, having his goals in the object. It is 
substantially un-thematic26. That is why the attitude that 
each man undertakes within the life-world is said to be 
natural. But the objects and the contents towards which 
we direct our interests are not always the same. They 
change along with time and articulate the evolution of 
human culture. This overview coincides with that which 
prompts Klein to ascribe a kind of naturalness to the 
moderns, too.  
Stanley Rosen has reproached Strauss for having 
thought, in accordance with Husserl, that there was a time 
when such a thing as a “natural consciousness” existed. 
Rosen criticizes the idea according to which supposing 
the de-sedimentation of this pre-scientific life-world 
could purge modernity of its defects27. If this is Strauss’s 
view, it doubtless does not belong to Husserl. Let me 
spell this out by employing another philosophical exam-
ple which Strauss takes into account. 
 In his article on “The Living Issues of German Post-
war Philosophy” Strauss recalls Schiller’s essay On Naïve 
and Sentimental Poetry28. Schiller, he noticed, “had de-
scribed the relation of the moderns to the ancients in these 
terms: the Greeks were nature, whereas for modern man, 
nature, being natural, is only an ought, an ideal; modern 
man has a longing for what was real in Greece.”29 How-
ever, as Péter Szondi has demonstrated,30 Schiller clearly 
distinguishes the natural way of living from the naive 
way. Greek man is not aware of being nature. When he 
becomes aware—that is as to say when he becomes a phi-
losopher—it is no longer natural. Yet, two chances are 
still at stake: to seek naturalness or to live artificially. By 
employing this argument in order to interpret the quarrel 
between the ancients and the moderns, two different posi-
tions can be taken: one corresponds to that of Friedrich 
Schlegel, the other to that which Szondi attributes to 
Schiller. The first is ascribable to Strauss, the second to 
Klein.  
According to Schlegel, naturalness coincides with the 
spontaneity of classical poetry; no naivety in the composi-
tional activity belongs to the modern poet31. Szondi states 
that he or she who has a longing for the natural way of 
living could reactivate the characteristic attitude of Greek 
man in a recasted manner. Naivety has to be acquired, by 
reproducing a particular way of living characterized by 
spontaneity. Furthermore, the naivety is no historical 
paradigm; rather, it is a mode of feeling, as Schiller re-
peatedly writes.  
 Similarly to Schlegel, Strauss holds that the world as it 
is present for, and experience by, a natural point of view 
had been discussed by Plato and Aristotle and not by the 
founders of modern philosopher, nor by its successors. An 
example of this would be Hegel, who, in Strauss’s view, 
“had indeed attempted to understand ‘the concrete’, the 
phenomena themselves, but he had tried to ‘construct’ 
them by starting from the ‘abstract’. Whereas this was 
precisely the meaning of the Socratic turning: that science 
must start from the known, from the ‘known to us’, from 
what is known in ordinary experience, and that science 
consists in understanding what is known indeed, but non 
understood adequately.”32 This conviction prompts 
Strauss to conclude what follows: 
 
Platonic and Aristotelian terms appeared to have a directness 
[…] absent from the modern concepts which all presuppose that 
break, effected by Descartes and continued by all his successors, 
with natural knowledge. Therefore, if we want to arrive at an 
adequate understanding of the ‘natural’ world, we simply have 
to learn from Plato and Aristotle.33 
  
Like Szondi, and more closely to Husserl’s notion of the 
life-world, Klein states that we are natural, once we live 
spontaneously and straightforwardly. A philosopher who 
is able to describe the horizon of his or her specific life-
world undertakes a natural or genuine attitude. This is 
possible at any time because nature is not only to be 
understood as the cosmos. It is, rather, “in human under-
standing, multidimensional.”34 By “nature” we may mean 
physis, that is “the natural being of every entity existing 
‘by nature’ […] within the texture of the world-order.”35 
But, within the sphere of nature, we may also encompass 
all that becomes familiar to us, all that has acquired the 
character of a “second nature”: “Almost every artful hu-
man activity tends to reproduce itself, to repeat itself, to 
make the artful product as familiar.”36  
The difference is, therefore, between the natural 
understood as the cosmic element and the natural as 
understood as the horizon of the familiar. The domain of 
the latter is wider than that of the former, since it is infi-
nite and tends to be broadened out continuously, whereas 
that of the cosmos is limited and it is “the only original 
subject of philosophy.”  Unlike Klein, Strauss exclusively 
identifies the natural element with the cosmos: “The ele-
mentary, the natural subject of philosophy still is, and al-
ways will be, as it had been for the Greeks: the cosmos, 
the world.”37  
 This decisive difference between Strauss and Klein 
determines their approach to the quarrel and the meaning 
they attribute to the return to the ancients. Both Strauss 
and Klein think that the naturalness of ancient philosophy 
cannot be renewed in the modern or, better, in the post-
modern time. However, the awareness that the ancient 
mode of living and thinking cannot really be duplicated 
leads the two authors to undertake two different attitudes: 
Strauss thinks that we should act as if the ancient mode of 
philosophizing was renewable; Klein thinks that the ac-
tivity of the post-modern philosopher should consist of 
making the conceptual frame, which the founders of mod-
ern philosophy assumed to be natural, unfamiliar and un-
known. Klein defines this activity history by recovering 
the ancient meaning according to which “historìa” desig-
nates the inquiry through which we conspicuously grasp 
the original essence of things, the rizomata panton, as 
Klein says by quoting the end of Husserl’s article on Phi-
losophy as Rigorous Science38.  
In his essay on Phenomenology and the History of 
Science, Klein points out that Husserl’s phenomenology 
aims at discovering, rediscovering and elucidating the be-
ginnings, the origins and the “invariables” of things. 
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“This is”, he adds, “the attitude of a true historian”39. But 
he also specifies what follows:  
 
The origin of history is in itself a non-historical problem. What-
ever historical research might be required to solve it, it leads 
ultimately to a kind of inquiry which is beyond the scope of a 
historian, whose purpose is to give the ‘story’ of a given ‘fact’. 
It may, indeed, lead back to the problem of inquiry, the problem 
of historia as such, that is, to the very problem underlying 
Husserl’s concept of ‘intentional history’.40 
 
In Klein’s view, history, understood in the manner just 
described, “cannot be separated from philosophy.”41 This 
philosophic-historical activity consists in rediscovering 
the significant formation [Gebilde] latently shaping, and 
acting on, a sedimented conceptual frame: “This inter-
lacement of original production and ‘sedimentation’ of 
significance constitutes the true character of history.” 
From this point of view there would only be one legiti-
mate form of history: the history of human thought. The 
main problem of any historical research would precisely 
be “the disentanglement of all these strata of ‘sedimenta-
tion’ with the ultimate goal of reactivating the ‘original 
foundations’, i.e., of descending to the true beginnings, to 
the ‘roots’, of any science and, consequently, of all pres-
cientific conceptions of mankind as well.”42  
 In describing the philosophical activity of the historian 
of philosophy, Klein takes the history of philosophy to be 
an integral and, above all, an essential part of philosophy 
independently of any time. It belongs to philosophy in an-
cient as well as in modern ages. However, in two epochs, 
the object towards which the historical activity is directed 
changes. The object of ancient philosophy is the cosmos, 
nature as the eternal element, and the aim of the ancient 
philosopher is to grasp the gap between the essences of 
things and their contingent manifestations. In modern 
times, the task of the philosophical historian of philoso-
phy is to distinguish the conceptual frame derived by in-
herited knowledge from the approach a philosopher has 
genuinely acquired by looking at his or her life-world. As 
Klein has explained in his Greek Mathematical Thought 
and the Origin of Algebra, the aims are many: 1. To grasp 
the different attitudes the ancients and the moderns ad-
opted in their scientific and philosophic inquiry; 2. To 
keep separate the conceptual frame that the moderns in-
herited by school science and by medieval tradition from 
the conceptual frame and the method they got through 
their living interests (experimental activity, applied me-
chanics and optics, arts such as architecture and painting); 
3. To establish what the moderns lost with regard to the 
ancients, what they discover independently of their pre-
suppositions, what they do in continuity with the ancients, 
what they do in opposition to the ancients or by re-
elaborating and decisively modifying their bequest.   
 Even Strauss says that “‘history’ originally designated 
a particular kind of knowledge or inquiry.”43 However, he 
holds that the meaning of the term changes when histori-
cism assumes history as a field. Even Strauss thinks that 
we have to think of the gap between the ancients and the 
moderns without taking in advance a position on the value 
of the two attitudes. We must bracket progressivism. 
However, Strauss’s position diverges from that of Klein, 
since he places no trust in a philosophical form of the his-
torical inquiry. Rather, he is more interested in a form of 
hermeneutics that is a post-modern re-elaboration of 
medieval commentary.  
 In his essay on Political philosophy and History, 
Strauss points out that medieval philosophy was “depend-
ent” on classical philosophy, and yet it was not in need of 
the history of philosophy as an integral part of its philo-
sophic efforts:  
 
“When a medieval philosopher studied Aristotle’s Politics, he 
did not engage in a historical study. The Politics was for him an 
authoritative text. Aristotle was the philosopher, and hence the 
teaching of the Politics was, in principle, the true philosophic 
teaching. However he might deviate from Aristotle in details 
[…], the basis of the medieval philosopher’s thought remained 
the Aristotelian teaching. That basis was always present to him, 
it was contemporaneous with him.”44  
 
For Strauss, it is precisely this contemporaneity of a 
thought with its basis which no longer exists in modern 
philosophy, and it is such a contemporaneity that explains 
the transformation of modern philosophy into an intrinsi-
cally historical philosophy.  
 In his essay on The Living Issues of German Post-war 
Philosophy, Strauss claims that once we apply historicism 
to itself by arranging “a critical analysis of the genesis of 
historical consciousness,”45 we make a return to reason 
possible. This process “necessarily is a return to reason as 
reason was understood in pre-modern times.”46 Accord-
ingly, he raises the following questions: “Modern phi-
losophy has come into being as a refutation of traditional 
philosophy, i.e. of Aristotelian philosophy. Have the 
founders of modern philosophy really refuted Aristotle? 
Have they ever understood him? They certainly under-
stood the Aristotelians of their time, but they certainly did 
not understand Aristotle himself.”47 The conclusion is that 
“if Plato and Aristotle are not understood and conse-
quently not refuted, return to Plato and Aristotle is an 
open possibility.”48  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In Strauss' view, the aims of the philosopher who is 
able to reactivate and rethink the quarrel between the an-
cients and the moderns can be summed up as follows: 1. 
He attempts to make ancient philosophers and their con-
ceptual frame contemporaneous to him; 2. Aristotle’s and 
Plato’s writings and teachings cannot be considered as 
surpassed; he tries to take them as if they were still auth-
oritative texts; 3. He strives to understand a philosopher 
as being as good as, or better than, himself. 
Strauss’s position is the mirror-image of that of Klein. 
Strauss thinks that we should try to make ancient philoso-
phy and the ancient life-world familiar to us; Klein thinks 
we should study ancient philosophy49 and the ancient life-
world in order to make the modern conceptual frame, 
which acts on us as Aristotelian tradition did on the foun-
ders of modern philosophy, unfamiliar to us. For Strauss, 
the return to the ancients lets us know the original inter-
ests of ancient philosophers in a deeper way. For Klein, 
the return to the ancients leads us back to the hidden roots 
of modern philosophy.  
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 Both Strauss and Klein think of philosophy as a hu-
man activity originally characterized by the act of ques-
tioning. However, whereas Strauss tends to see a devel-
opment and a training of this questioning in the herme-
neutics, in the ongoing capacity of interpreting unfamiliar 
texts, Klein thinks that we may bring up our philosophical 
dispositions by devoting ourselves to the history of phi-
losophy, that is by inquiring how philosophical paradigms 
evolve over the centuries.   
 
Notes 
 
* I had the opportunity to discuss the issues I address here with many 
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